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1 Introduction 
There are many aspects of security one needs to consider when developing web-based 
applications using media like Flash. News articles report daily security vulnerabilities and 
hacking attacks of online applications. Because of these, consumers are growing 
increasingly concerned about misuse of their personal information and are mistrustful of 
the security protection firms are employing. To protect consumers, federal and state 
agencies have enacted some legislation to attempt to secure systems and to protect 
consumer personal data, so it is mandatory that institutions understand legal issues related 
to security when developing their systems. In addition, institutional developers need to 
understand the technical framework when creating web-based applications, and review 
security of their systems before implementing on production servers.  
However, despite both legal mandates and advice to fully test and develop secure 
systems; many educational institutions are not fully protecting their web users. This 
research analyses the level of security vulnerabilities among 250 US educational sites 
utilising Flash-based pages using a software tool, SwfScan, developed by Hewlett 
Packard (HP). It reviews the most common types of Flash-based vulnerabilities and 
recommends some methods to improve security. 
2 Framework for web security 
2.1 Legal aspects 
There are a wide range of US federal and state laws which are aimed to protect personal 
consumer information collected and stored in computer systems. Most of these laws are 
dependent on one’s industry, so it is imperative that application developers understand 
and adhere to specific legal mandates to protect the data of their consumers. The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) covers securing personal data 
within the healthcare industry while the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) mandates 
protection for the financial industry (Johnson, 2005). Although the GLB is usually geared 
towards the financial industry, in 2002 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ruled that 
colleges and universities are covered under this law, and it requires institutions to have 
data-security systems in place (‘Legislators try to shore up…’, 2004). 
Educational institutions including those in higher education must adhere to Family 
Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). This federal privacy law prohibits 
institutions from disclosing personally identifiable information without a student’s 
permission (Salomon et al., 2003). The authors explain that a significant technology risk 
is that the number of computerised records on databases have increased exponentially, 
thus increasing the likelihood of potential security vulnerabilities.  
“An institution may be particularly vulnerable to a FERPA violation if it can be 
shown that it was negligent in instituting procedures to protect against 
disclosure of electronic records. At the same time, however, continuous 
changes in the technology environment, combined with the often decentralized 
nature of institutions’ networks, make it difficult to ensure that appropriate 
practices are in place. For example, the movement away from mainframe 
systems and toward distributed databases and servers has made it more difficult 
to have consistent and clear data access policies and procedures.” (Salomon 
et al., 2003) 
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Thus, educational institutions must have clear policies related to data protection. 
However, even with clear policies, if there is a lack of training of the staff or application 
developers, the institution may still find itself at risk to data theft and security holes 
within their systems.  
Some states have enacted their own laws to protect computerised students records. 
California was the first state to enact a security breach law – the 2003 California 
Database Security Breach 1386 (CA SB 1386), which requires prompt notification of any 
data breaches affecting California citizens, including students at educational institutions. 
This would also affect universities outside of California who have students who are 
California residents (Johnson, 2005). Thus, higher education officials throughout 
the USA would have to notify California students if data issues occurred, and it is to the 
benefit of these institutions to ensure that their computer applications are secure. 
Since California’s implementation, 44 other states have/are considering acting laws that 
require businesses and other institutions that maintain personal consumer data to give 
consumers timely notice of a breach in the security of their personal information 
(Coakley, 2009). New York and Arizona limit the use and/or disclosure of Social 
Security numbers (SSNs) for educational institutions (Salomon et al., 2003). Thus, 
developers of computer applications need to be aware of a variety of state and federal 
laws when creating applications that use or store personal data.  
2.2 University security breaches 
There have been a myriad of computer security breaches at US universities, putting many 
staff and students at risk for personal data disclosure. According to Security Directors 
Report (2008), in USA there were 167 reported breaches in a variety of industries 
including: military, education, banking, medical and other businesses. Of these, 
educational institutions accounted for 25% of all breaches in the first three months of 
2008, with 2.9% of compromised personal records in the total number of records stolen in 
these categories. According to Young (2008a), a report by Identity Theft Resource Center 
indicates that number of data-security incidents at colleges and universities across the 
country rose 47% between 2007 and 2008. These numbers include reported statistics, 
although there could be a sizable increase with the numbers of unreported or 
undiscovered breaches.  
In February 2009, the University of Florida admitted a security breach exposed the 
names and SSNs of 97,200 students, faculty and staff who attended the school between 
1996 and 2008. It also had other data breaches in October and November 2008. The latest 
breach was caused by a server configuration error (Vijayan, 2009). In 2006, Ohio 
University had five data breaches resulting in the theft of 173,000 SSNs and hackers 
using unsecured servers to launch attacks against outside systems. These breaches had 
such a negative impact on public relations that the school reported an 88% decline in 
donations once the breaches were reported (Culnan and Carlin, 2009). 
2.3 Application security 
Young (2008b) reports there are a myriad of computer security threats that universities 
face, but one of the top one includes malware, a large category which can include 
infected and unsecured code. According to Waters (2009), the rise of web-based 
applications is the number one avenue of malicious hacker attacks. The root of most 
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problems is due to software issues, such as poor coding practices in the applications, and 
that it is difficult for developers to build secure systems. Waters also adds that 
educational institutions are finding more media-based applications, like Flash, containing 
security vulnerabilities. This is a growing problem for schools as more schools are 
putting online educational content online using media and web-based applications. 
Although application developers could easily become the scapegoat for web application 
systems, school administrators should realise that programmers may not have the 
knowledge or training or create secure applications, and project managers may value 
speedy development and functionality over secure systems (Waters, 2009). 
In 2008, Culnan and Carlin (2009) conducted a privacy study of the top 236 schools 
from the US News and World Report 2004 list of best colleges. Although most of the 
study dealt with general privacy risk practices and notices, part of the study involved 
analysing privacy risk associated with web-based data collection forms (although not 
necessarily Flash-based forms). They found that of the 236 schools, all had at least one 
non-secure page with a data collection form, with an average of 424 such pages per 
school. Nearly all had at least one data collection form that used the HTTP GET method 
to submit the data with an average of 209 instances per school, a problem which could 
result in personal data to be made visible to unauthorised individuals. Their study 
suggested that nearly all institutions engaged in poor security practices that put personal 
data at risk.  
A specific study on Flash-based application security was conducted by HP in 2008. 
They downloaded and audited 4,000 Flash applications and found numerous insecure 
security vulnerabilities including: 
• of 250 Flash applications that had a login form 15% had user names or passwords 
hard-coded inside the application code 
• 16% of SWF applications targeting Flash Player 8 and earlier contained XSS 
vulnerabilities 
• 35% of all SWF applications violated Adobe’s security best practices 
• 77% of SWF applications targeting Flash Player 9 and 10 contained developer 
debugging information and source code file references (HP Application Security 
Center Community, 2009). 
A serious problem in university security is that professors, colleges, departments and 
even student organisations regularly create and maintain separate shadow systems. So 
even if the university does have secure core applications and specific security policies, 
these shadow systems could create security vulnerabilities (Titus, 2008). According to 
Culnan and Carlin (2009), academic departments may bypass core university systems and 
operate their own individual servers. In addition, individual faculty, students and school 
organisations have their own systems, bypassing corporate servers and policies. For 
example, a staff member could create a separate Flash application to collect 
miscellaneous user information and this application could be developed with minimal 
thought to security, or could bypass corporate security policies and development 
procedures. Another reason for security problems in higher education institutions is that 
staff may be unaware of legal regulations that apply to the industry (Johnson, 2005). Or, 
staff may be unaware of specific university policies regarding safeguarding personal data. 
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They may also have minimal coding skills when developing applications and could be 
unaware of safe development practices regarding securing data.  
2.4 Flash security framework 
Adobe (previously Macromedia) aims with its Flash application is to provide robust 
security by using existing security solutions, architecture and protocols to avoid 
vulnerabilities exposures. Because of an integrated approach, institutions should not have 
to employ additional security solutions outside the Flash architecture and platform 
(Ludwig, 2005). Ludwig explains that in order to prevent malicious code from being 
spread, Flash utilises a sandbox approach where the application code is separate from the 
host system. In addition, to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) threats, Flash content is 
delivered as a series of instructions in binary format to Flash Player over web protocols in 
the SWF file format in comparison to string-based language solutions. Protection against 
unauthorised access to private user information can be controlled through security 
settings and permissions (Ludwig, 2005). Thus, the Flash framework itself can supply a 
high level of security to protect against disclosure of personal information and other 
security vulnerabilities. However, even though Adobe has implemented secure features 
within the architecture, it is still up to developers to implement safe coding within the 
context of the framework. If they do not, security problems could still affect web 
applications. According to Fukami and Fuhrmanne (2008) one issue with Flash security 
is that most developers only superficially test Flash pages and in most cases, no testing of 
ActionScript functions happens. Many companies view Flash as a way to show pictures 
on sites, and do not realise that Flash can carry full applications. The authors give an 
analysis on two common methods of Flash attacks. First, HTTP GET requests could 
result in redirection attacks. Also, privacy concerns could results with so-called local 
shared objects (Flash cookies). 
3 Methodology 
The research was accomplished through completing an analysis of 250 US education sites 
containing Flash SWF applications to determine the most prevalent security problems for 
these sites. The project consisted of four phases: 
1 choosing an online testing tool 
2 choosing a list of education sites to test 
3 run a software analysis 
4 perform an in-depth analysis of the results. 
3.1 Choosing a testing tool 
The first phase of the study was to choose a tool to test for Flash application 
vulnerabilities. For this study, a software product from HP, called SwfScan, was chosen. 
This is a relatively new product which was released in March 2009 to allow web 
developers to test Adobe Flash applications for various types of security vulnerabilities. 
According to HP, it works in the following manner: 
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• decompiles applications built on the Adobe Flash platform to extract the 
ActionScript code and statically analyses it to identify security issues like 
information disclosure 
• identifies and reports insecure programming and deployment practices and suggests 
solutions 
• enables auditing of third party applications without requiring access to the 
source code 
• audit the code for over 60 vulnerabilities including exposure of confidential data, 
XSS and cross-domain privilege escalation 
• validate Flash application adherence to Adobe Best Practice (HP, 2009; HP 
Application Security Center Community, 2009). 
Although a variety of Flash testing tools do exist, there were several reasons why this tool 
was chosen compared to other products, such as cost and testing of ActionScript versions 
2.0 and 3.0. For example, a product by AsUnit, SWF UI, only tests ActionScript 2.0 
(AsUnit, 2009). IBM’s Rational AppScan software is a very comprehensive software 
product testing Flash and other web applications for security vulnerabilities (IBM, 
2009a). However, this product cost ranged from $17,550 to $32,000, with a trial version 
available. However, the free trial was limited to 30 day and was limited in functionality 
testing (IBM, 2009b). Another software package reviewed was SWFIntruder developed 
by Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). However, although this product is 
open source and free, one significant issue with using it is that it requires downloading 
the software on a server in order to test Flash applications and these applications can only 
be tested on the Firefox browser (OWASP, 2008). Finally, the ‘erlswf’ toolkit allows 
disassembly of SWF code and was designed to test security. However, it is only designed 
for ActionScript 2 tags and it is still missing some testing abilities, for example full 
AVM2/ActionScript 3 support and support for ActionScript 2 tags other than DoAction 
and DoInitAction (Fukami and Fuhrmanne, 2008) Therefore, based on an analysis of 
functionality as well as the free cost to use HP’s product, SwfScan was chosen. 
3.2 Choosing testing sites 
The second phase of this project involved choosing a list of education sites in order to 
analyse for Flash vulnerabilities. To accomplish this, an advanced search of Google was 
performed with the following search criteria: ‘login site:.edu filetype:swf’. The first 
parameter was a keyword search for the term ‘login’. This was chosen in order to obtain 
as many Flash applications as possible that would have login capabilities or login screens, 
thus necessitating the need for greater security in security personal data in the login. It 
should be noted that although this keyword was used in the search, the results would not 
necessarily guarantee that a login screen would be a result of a search. If the text ‘login’ 
was used anywhere in the Flash application, whether it was an actual login screen or not, 
this would result in the application site being included within the search result. However, 
using this search term in Google would result in a higher probability of a login 
application. The second parameter was ‘.edu’ which would only bring up sites with an 
US education suffix within the uniform resource locator (URL). The final Google search 
parameter was ‘.swf’, which would only produce sites that contain Flash-based 
applications.  
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The top 250 results from this Google search contained a vast majority of US 
university educational institutions. There were a variety of different functional 
applications. One example was login screens which would require users to enter sensitive 
information such as user IDs and passwords. Other site results were purely informational 
web-based Flash applications not requiring users to enter information into the site.  
3.3 Running the software analysis 
The product software is downloaded from the HP site and can be installed on a stand-
alone computer system with access to the internet. The software is started and the 
designer can choose whether or not to test 70 different error checks. Each specific error 
check is divided into a criticality ranking (critical, high, medium and low).  
• Critical: severe impact problems that have serious repercussions on user security and 
lead to an extreme probability of risk and damage potential. These should be 
corrected as soon as possible. 
• High: serious impact problems that can pose a significant level of security risk to 
users, and should also be addressed promptly.  
• Medium: moderate problems that could pose some level of risk to users. These 
should be corrected, but with less urgency than the critical and highly ranked errors.  
• Low: minor issues that pose slight or harmless risk to users, but should be reviewed 
by application designers. These may or may not need to be addressed based on the 
effort and cost to correct based upon the level of risk.  
This phase of the study was completed in April 2009, and involved using SwfScan to 
determine the main types of Flash checkpoint errors and the quantity of each error. 
Although the software allows one to choose which of the 70 available Flash errors to test, 
for this study all 70 error checks were chosen to test for each of the 250 web applications. 
The URL of each of the 250 websites to be tested was typed into a selection box and each 
individual test was compiled. For each URL run, an individual error report was produced 
listing which specific Flash-based errors were found for that URL. In addition, each error 
was listed by the criticality of the specific error. The next phase of this project was to take 
the raw data from the SwfScan results and compile it into tabular format and analyse the 
results.  
4 Analysis of results  
Results in Table 1 show the number and types of Flash errors reported within the 250 
university sites tested. The first column of the table shows the specific type of error, 
while the second column is the level of severity for that error (critical, high, medium and 
low). Column three contains the number of errors that were reported across 250 sites, 
while the fourth column is the calculated percentage of the type of error for the total 
number of sites. The final column lists the potential application or coding fix suggested 
by HP in order to ensure this type of error does not occur. 
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Table 1 Flash error statistics and fixes 
Type of error Criticality # errors Percent Fix 
Insecure 
Security.AllowDomain() 
Critical 6 2.4 Avoid using a wildcard as parameter 
in a Security.allowDomain() method 
call. Instead specify a list of trusted 
domains in the allowDomain call 
FlashVars Cross Scripting  High 5 2.0 Properly validating user supplied 
input via white listing 
FlashVars Cross 
Scripting/Request Forgery 
High 5 2.0 Properly validating user supplied 
input via white listing 
Insecure Flash Storage 
Object 
High 1 0.4 Configure the localPath of the 
shared object to allow only trusted 
SWFs at specific URL paths to gain 
access to the shared object 
Possible Cross-site scripting 
in getURL using ‘GET’ 
High 5 2.0 Perform proper validation on the 
data before making a request to the 
URL via a getURL call 
Possible FlashVars 
Cross-Site Scripting in 
HTMLtext property bound 
to an Uninitiialised 
Variable 
High 6 2.4 Avoid using undefined or 
uninitialised variables and validate 
values obtained from user through 
FlashVars 
Debug Messaging Medium 31 12.4 Set ‘Omit Trace Actions’ to ‘true’ 
MD5 Hash Detected  Medium 2 0.8 Only use cryptographically secure 
hashing algorithms 
Potential User Account 
Information Disclosure 
Medium 51 20.4 Ensure information of potential 
value to an attacker is not being left 
in application code 
Possible Application 
Information Disclosure 
Low 13 5.2 Ensure information of potential 
value to an attacker is not being left 
in application code 
Possible Commerce 
Information 
Low 1 0.4 Ensure information of potential 
value to an attacker is not being left 
in application code 
Possible Cryptographic 
Data 
Low 1 0.4 Ensure information of potential 
value to an attacker is not being left 
in application code 
Potential Interesting Name 
Encountered 
Low 4 1.6 Ensure information of potential 
value to an attacker is not being left 
in application code 
Potential Personal 
Information Disclosure 
Low 27 10.8 Ensure information of potential 
value to an attacker is not being left 
in application code 
Shared Flash Storage 
Object 
Low 8 3.2 Do not store sensitive information in
the local stored objects 
Suggested Security Controls 
for Embedding SWF Files in 
HTML 
Low 248 99.2 When embedding SWF in HTML 
page, set the Allow Networking 
Access flag to internal 
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Of the 250 sites tested, only 2 (0.8%) did not have any reported Flash issues. The vast 
majority of sites had the error ‘Suggested Security Controls for Embedding SWF Files in 
HTML’ reported. According to HP documentation this indicates that the SWFScan 
examined the Flash ActionScript and revealed that it did not utilise any browser or 
network communication functionality (HP, 2009).  
Table 1 results show that there were six other low-criticality errors. The second most 
common of this category was ‘Potential Personal Information Disclosure’, which was 
found in 27 sites (10.8%). This error indicates that there is a potential vulnerability due to 
the presence of a ‘keyword’ that would allow personal information to be disclosed. To fix 
the problem, application designers or coders should ensure that this potential personal 
information is not left within the application code. Five other low-criticality errors 
existed where similar information could be viewed within the application code. These 
included: ‘Possible Application Information Disclosure’, found in 13 sites (5.2%), 
‘Possible Commerce Information’ (1 site and 0.4%), ‘Possible Cryptographic Data’ 
(1 site and 0.4%), ‘Potential Interesting Name Encountered’ (4 sites and 1.6%) and 
‘Potential Personal Information Disclosure’ (27 sites and 10.8%). The final low-severity 
problem was ‘Shared Flash Storage Object’, which means that the data stored in shared 
objects are not encrypted and could be prone to unauthorised access depending on the 
access restrictions specified by the developer (HP, 2009). This problem was found in 
eight sites (3.2%). 
There were three errors of medium level severity found in these results. A sizable 
number of sites were found with the error ‘Potential User Account Information 
Disclosure’ (51 sites, 20.4%). This error is similar in function to the five low-severity 
errors where information is displayed via application code, although this specific error is 
of a more serious nature. Another medium-ranked problem was ‘Debug Messaging’ with 
31 sites (12.4%) containing this issue. According to HP (2009) this specific fault 
indicates that the trace() function is being utilised and was detected due to the presence of 
Debug Messaging. This could indicate a serious security concern as path names and other 
information could be revealed to hackers. Finally, the third error in this category was 
‘MD5 Hash Detected’, which indicates that a string of hexadecimal digits matching the 
length of a cryptographic hash from the MD family was detected. These hashes are used 
to protect passwords and other sensitive personal data. Certain hashes such as MD5, 
MD4 and MD2 are especially susceptible to attacks, and should not be considered 
secured. Therefore, they should only be used in certain situations. 
There were five error types within the ‘high’ ranking category, with the number of 
sites ranging from one error up to the maximum of six sites displaying a specific error. 
The most common error in this category was ‘Possible FlashVars Cross-Site Scripting in 
HTMLtext property bound to an Uninitialised Variable’ (six sites, 2.4%). These types of 
XSS vulnerabilities can be manipulated by hackers to steal cookies, create requests that 
could be mistaken from those of a valid user, compromise confidential information or 
execute malicious code on client systems (HP, 2009). Three other specific scripting errors 
were found in five sites each (2.0%). These were: 
1 ‘FlashVars Cross Scripting’ 
2 ‘FlashVars Cross Scripting/Request Forgery’ 
3 ‘Possible Cross-site scripting in getURL using ‘GET’’. 
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In addition to compromising confidential information and executing malicious code, if 
JavaScript is used within the application, appended malicious text can be used to execute 
arbitrary JavaScript code leading to a XSS attack (HP, 2009). The fifth type of high-
ranking error encountered was ‘Insecure Flash Storage Object’, displayed by one site 
(0.4%). This error indicates that if designers incorrectly set a localPath value, all SWF 
files on that domain, including multiple parties, could therefore have unauthorised data 
access.  
There was one critical error in the study results, which was ‘Insecure Security 
AllowDomain()’, found in six sites (2.4%). To provide secure SWF applications, it is 
important to restrict loading of remote SWFs to trusted domains only by using the 
System.security.allowDomain() method. However, if an incorrect parameter is passed to 
a Security.allowDomain method call, the developer can have an overly permissive cross-
domain setting which could lead to threats such as cross-domain privilege escalation, data 
injection and unauthorised data access (HP, 2009). 
5 Implications 
Evaluation results show that the majority of university Flash applications have some type 
of security issues. The vast majority of sites had the low-criticality problem ‘Suggested 
Security Controls for Embedding SWF Files in HTML’ reported. Recommendations to 
fix the problem include setting the AllowNetworkingAccess flag to none. This will 
implicitly disable the SWF applications communication ability to the browser or network 
(HP, 2009). However, it should be noted that this is a low priority issue. Based on the 
cost to fix and other business factors, a fix may or may not be appropriate. Of the six 
other low-severity errors, five were very similar in the types of information that would be 
disclosed including: 
1 Possible Application Information Disclosure. 
2 Possible Commerce Information. 
3 Possible Cryptographic Data. 
4 Potential Interesting Name Encountered. 
5 Potential Personal Information Disclosure. 
For each of these errors, the similarity in the functionality resulted in HP recommending 
a similar fix, ensuring information of potential value to an attacker is not being left in 
application code and to remove that information from the production server (HP, 2009). 
The final low-priority error was ‘Shared Flash Storage Object’, and the recommended fix 
was not to store sensitive information in the local stored objects (HP, 2009). 
There were three medium-priority errors, with the most common being ‘Potential 
User Account Information Disclosure’. The fix for this error was the same as the fix for 
the majority of low-ranked errors where personal information was revealed, ensuing 
information is not being left in application code. The next most common medium-ranked 
error dealt with displaying debug messaging, and HP’s recommended fix was to remove 
all debugging messaging from the application code before it is moved to the production 
servers. Designers should also set the ‘Omit Trace Actions’ to ‘true’, which will make the 
published SWF smaller and will remove any excess information or actions from the 
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SWF (HP, 2009). The MD5 Hash error occurs because this hash function is especially 
susceptible to attacks, and this MD5 hash should not be used. Instead, the application 
should use more secure cryptographical hash algorithms, such as SHA-224, SHA-256, 
SHA-384 or SHA-512 (HP, 2009). 
For the four high-priority scripting errors, HP (2009) recommends the following 
prevention techniques to minimise XSS attacks in Flash applications: 
• set appropriate allowScriptAccess and allowNetworking parameters within the 
HTML code 
• perform data validation on variables sent to URL functions to ensure only http:// and 
https:// protocols are allowed; validate that the URL is for an allowed domain or use 
relative URLs 
• escape special characters placed within HTML text fields  
• do not use HTML text fields unless HTML support is needed  
• compile the SWF for more recent Flash Player versions  
• encourage users to have the latest version of Flash Player to view your content. 
For the high-priority error ‘Insecure Flash Storage Object’, an incorrect setting of the 
localPath function could lead to vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the localPath be 
restricted to specific URL paths of trusted SWFs to gain access to the shared object. The 
critical error ‘Insecure Security.AllowDomain()’ could be avoided by not using a 
wildcard as parameter in the method call, and instead specifying a list of trusted domains 
in the call (HP, 2009). 
Fukami and Fuhrmanne (2008) give some specific technical advice for thwarting 
Flash-based attacks. One approach is to use run-time or dynamic code analysis to analyse 
reoccurring behaviours such as file downloads while residing in a safe testing 
environment. For security reviews outside the testing environment, they suggest using 
static code analysis, where the SWF file is disassembled in order to check for analysation 
patterns recognising various attack methods. 
Although technical recommendations aimed at the programmers for securing their 
Flash applications are most relevant for the purpose of this study, it should be realised 
that technical security measures addressing developers should be only one part of a multi-
phase security agenda in educational institutions. First, educational entities should 
analyse applicable federal, state and local ordinances with regards to security and 
personal data safeguards. Many laws have been already passed, and others are pending, 
so it would be wise for schools to coordinate with their legal advisors to properly assess 
and analyse applicable and upcoming legislation (Salomon et al., 2003). In addition, 
mandatory workshops or training for staff and developers should be held in order to 
update them on their legal obligations to provide secure systems and safeguarding 
consumer data. Staff should understand how to properly handle data, and application 
developers should be taught how improper security development could have an adverse 
affect on the school from a legal standpoint.  
A second practical solution that schools should implement is to periodically assess 
information security vulnerabilities and risks (Salomon et al., 2003). With tools such as 
SwfScan, schools could periodically run tests on their Flash (and other) applications to 
assess any security holes and risks. However, it should be noted that once a risk 
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assessment is completed, the school needs to take appropriate action to correct the 
problems. According to Salomon et al. (2003), if an institution identifies vulnerabilities 
and then fails to institute appropriate measures to remedy those issues, the institution 
could open itself up to potential liability if a breach should occur, especially if this 
information is later obtained by the public under a Freedom of information or ‘open 
records’ law request.  
A third tactic the institution should implement is to review and update secure policies 
and procedures. A school should develop a policy in line with the nature and magnitude 
of usual threats and respond with an appropriate level to ensure their information is being 
protected (Salomon et al., 2003). Along with developing these policies, it is important to 
educate staff as to the nature of the policies and to have some consequence in place if 
policies are not followed. In dealing with web application development, policies could 
exist where developers would have to test their applications for such Flash security 
problems as ‘Potential Personal Information Disclosure’ or ‘MD5 Hash Detected.’ The 
policy could state that approvals would have to be obtained before applications could be 
moved to a production server.  
Finally, secure application development needs to be a priority in project management. 
Waters (2009) indicates that ultimately, it is the developers who are responsible for 
security. However, instead of emphasising rapid development and functionality, project 
managers and institutional administrators also need to put a high priority on security.  
6 Conclusion 
This research shows that a preponderance of US educational sites using web-based Flash 
applications do not adequately secure these pages. Almost all pages showed at least low-
level security vulnerabilities, while over 20% of them had medium-level security issues 
where personal information could be disclosed to attackers. This indicates a serious 
concern for education sites, who are increasing the number of their Flash-based pages and 
applications, especially due to the growth of online learning. It may be impossible to 
make a web application 100% secure, but institutions need to implement a variety of 
policies in order to better secure their sites. There are a variety of technical, legal and 
procedural methods that institutions could effectively implement to provide a better level 
of consumer protection.  
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